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Abstract
Recent publications witness that there is a growing interest in multi-valued logics for ma-
chine learning; some of them arose as a more or less formal description of a computer
program's inferential behaviour. The referred origin of these systems is Belnap's four-
valued logic, which has been adopted for the various needs of knowledge representation in
a machine learning system. However, it is unclear what an inconsistent knowledge base
entails. We investigate Mobal's logic < and show how to interpret the term `paraconsis-
tent inference' of this system. It turns out that the meaning of the basic connective !
of < can be represented as a combination of two systems of Kleene's strong three-valued
logic, where the two systems dier in the set of designated truth values. The resulting
logic is functionally complete but the entailment relation is not axiomatizable. This draw-
back yields a fundamental dierence between nonmontonicity within belief-revision and
non-monotonic reasoning systems like Servi's renement 
1
of Gabbay's .
11 Paraconsistency
Paraconsistency is a general term to describe the property of a logic where the principle of
ex falso sequitur quodlibet (EFQ) fails, that is, something inconsistent
1
does not entail the
set of all well formed formulas (ws). To see how EFQ comes into play in standard logics,
consider the following example: suppose, we know fA;:Ag. Then, by OR-introduction
this set entails fA;:A_Bg for an arbitrary sentence B and by the principle of disjunctive
syllogism, we can conclude B from fA;:A_ Bg.
How can we avoid this fallacy? In general there are two possibilities. The rst one tries
to `clear' the inconsistent set of formulas, and the keyword is belief revision. The second
one allows inconsistencies in the sense of a paraconsistent logic. In order to formulate a
paraconsistent consequence relation we have to nd a model for fA;:Ag. Well, obviously
it is no problem to dene an appropriate truth table where fA;:Ag is satisable, but what
does this really mean? Belnap ([Belnap, 1977]) argues that we should not interpret the
sentence A ontologically but epistemically. That is, if an interpretation function assigns
the truth value true to A, then this does not mean `A is true' but `we have been told that
A is true'. Hence, fA;:Agmeans that we have been told (maybe by two dierent persons)
both, that A holds and that :A holds.
Our approach is to come up with a four-valued semantics, i.e., the set of truth values
is  = ft; f;>;?g. If I is an interpretation function, A an atomic sentence we write
I(A) = > in order to denote `A and :A hold' and I(A) = ? to denote `we do not have any
information about A', that is, it is unknown whether A holds or not. If a sentence has the
epistemic truth value > or ?, then its ontological status is uncertain which does not mean
that it will stay uncertain in eternity. A sentence whose truth value is > is overdetermined,
in the sense that we have too much data (and less information) concerning A and if its
truth value is ? then it is underdetermined. Note that the dierent interpretations of the
third truth value in some three-valued logics correspond to > and ?
2
.
1.1 Mobal from a logical point of view
Mobal's inference engine [Morik et al.,1933] and its underlying logic < try to accomodate
several aspects of paraconsistent reasoning, which will be shown to be incompatible. The
very postulate of < is that classical inconsistencies are allowed, in the sense that they
should be entailed (i.e. fA;B;A! :Bg ` :B), but from something inconsistent nothing
should be inferred (i.e. fA;:A;A ! Bg 6` B). These two principles are incompatible.
In order to see this let us state them more formally. Let Cn be a logical consequence
operator and ` a corresponding provability relation. The following is a wishlist for Cn.
1. Cn(fA;:Ag) 6= Form() , where Form() is the set of all well-formed formulas
w.r.t. to a signature .
1
Throughout the paper we will use the term `inconsistency' in order to describe contrary information,
which is the same in classical two-valued logic but in a multiple-valued logic we could have contrary
information within a set of sentences although there is a model for these sentences.
2
According to Rescher ([Rescher, 1969]), Bochvar interprets his third truth value as `paradoxi-
cal', `meaningless' or `undecidable' to overcome diculties that arise with antinomies whereas Kleene
([Kleene, 1952]) interprets the third value as a truth value gap. Another possibility is a partial interpreta-
tion where some sentences simply don't have a truth value.
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2. From something `inconsistent' nothing should be inferred:
` A;A! B 6` :A
` B
3. `Inconsistencies' should be allowed:
` A;:B;A! B
` B
The formalization of item 2) actually reads `conclude only from sentences which do not
contain contrary information' which is a rewording of the item's informal description. Item
3) is a punctualization of 1). If one is willing to accept two other rules (contraposition and
!-introduction) it is easy to show that the items on our wishlist are incompatible. Since
it is claimed by [Morik et al.,1933], p. 41, that the connectives ^ and ! have the usual
meaning (and therefore the usual properties) there is no reason to reject the following
rules of inference:
` A! B
` :B ! :A
(CP )
[` A]
.
.
.
.
` B
` A! B
(! I)
Now let us examine item 2 of the wishlist, which is our formulation of `from something
inconsistent, nothing should be inferred'. What is meant by this statement is that if
both A and :A are known as well as A ! B, then B should not be entailed. This
non-monotonic eect was originally called `blocking' by Wrobel (in [Morik et al.,1933]). A
special case may occur if we consider the set fA;A ! :Ag. The problem is that within
such a circularity and according to item 2 the derivation of :A could only be blocked, if
it was permitted in a previous step. Hence, fA;A! :Ag should not entail :A although
this cannot be guaranteed by the rule in item 2. On way to hack around this problem is
to reformulate item 2 as
` A;A! B 6` :A and B 6 :A
` B
where  stands for an appropriate notion of semantical equivalence.
The insuciency of this formulation can be seen by a counter-example because the
above pattern of odd loops can be applied in a more general form: X = fA;A! B;B !
:Ag 6` :A. A solution could be found if we had the following rule of inference
` A! B;B ! C
` A! C
Together with (! I) we can derive A ! :A from fA;:Ag and A ! :A from
fA ! B;B ! :Ag. To capture this strange kind of loops properly within a non-
monotonic inference rule, we introduce non-monotonic MP (NMP)
3
, which does not only
check whether :A is not derivable but if 6` A! :A.
3
This notion mirrors exactly a diculty by which all nonmonotonic formalisms are plagued (as stated
in [Servi, 1992]).
3` A;A! B 6` A! :A
` B
(NMP)
We think that this is the correct formalization of `from something inconsistent nothing
should be inferred'. We now show the incompatibility between NMP and item 3) of our
wishlist.
X = fA;:B;A! Bg ` A! :B by (! I)
` B ! :A by contraposition
` A! :A by transitivity
That is, there is a conict between `from something inconsistent, nothing should be
inferred' and `inconsistencies are allowed'.
2 Semantical investigation
In the last section we have seen that the main aspects of Mobal's concept of paraconsis-
tency { using a straightforward formulation { are incompatible. In order to make a new
wishlist, we have to point out which logical preliminaries we accept. These preliminaries
concern basic properties of the entailment relation as well as the logical connectives. Our
requirements concerning these two points will be put into a formal framework in the next
section, therefore we want to leave some things intuitive for now. As a language we assume
atomic propositions, negation (:), disjunction (_) and implication (!). A formula can
take the truth value overdetermined (>), undened (?) true (t) or false (f). As designated
truth values we take t and >. Note that these imply a concept of entailment based on the
standard notion of Bolzano.
For the entailment relation we have the following properties in mind: rst, it should
be reexive, i.e.
` A
` A
Reexivity
Cumulativity is needed to guarantee the order-independence of entailment steps, that
is if X entails A then the addition of A to X does not block the entailment of an arbitrary
sentence B entailed by X (hence, causes no additional non-monotonic eect).
X ` A X ` B
X [ A ` B
Cumulativity
For the connectives :;_;!: we wish them to be as close as possible to classical logic.
That is, we want to have double negation, material implication and the usual denition
of satisability for _ (a disjunct statement is satised if one of its disjuncts is satised).
Additionally we have to give up one of the most important properties of classical logic,
the principle of tertium non datur. To pretty print these thoughts
` ::A
` A
DN
` A! B
` :A _B
MI
` A _B
` B _A
` A _ A
` A
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As a derived rule, we have contraposition. The invalidity of tertium non datur can
only be stated semantically. Now let's focal the real point of paraconsistent reasoning.
If we take ! as material implication, the sentence A ! :A reduces to :A _ :A which
equals :A. Since our entailment relation should be reexive, we have
` A;A! :A
` :A
At a rst glance this looks strange, since there is an inference from something `incon-
sistent' via modus ponens but a closer look shows, that :A was given explicitely by the
assertion of A! :A.
Another point on our former wishlist was the avoidance of odd loops, i.e.,
` A! B; B ! :A
6` A! :A
Now, if we transform the two implications in the premise, we get f:A _B;:B _ :Ag
from which we cannot conclude :A, since B could be overdetermined and therefore :A is
not entailed. This sounds reasonable and is very close to the behaviour of Mobal. But
the crucial point is: can we expect X = fA;:B;A ! Bg to entail B? Clearly, X entails
:B ! :A by contraposition. If we allow the derivation of B, then we must allow the
derivation of :A. But then we would have applied modus ponens to A;A ! B although
A and :A holds. Hence, neither :A nor B should be entailed by X . To see that this
argument is consistent with our semantical view, transform A! B to :A_B which yields
X
0
= fA;:B;:A _Bg. A could be overdetermined as well as B. If A is overdetermined,
:A _ B is satised but not B, and if B is overdetermined the disjunction is satised but
not :A. Hence, neither B nor :A should be entailed by X
0
.
The last point shows that if we accept a few properties of our entailment relation
(Inclusion, Cumulativity) and a few standard characteristics of the logical connectives
:;_ and !, the aims of Mobal's paraconsistent logic
 inconsistencies should be allowed and inconsistent conclusions should be drawn (via
a restricted version of MP) and
 from something inconsistent no conclusion should be drawn via MP.
are still incompatible.
2.1 Truth tables
Up to now we have mentioned paraconsistency and the behaviour of > in an inference.
But nothing has been said about the fourth truth value, ?, except that it means something
like `underdetermined' and does not belong to the set of designated truth values. In this
section we develop a complete truth table for the basic connectives ^ (conjunction) and
: (negation), from which _ and ! can be dened
4
. From these tables we obtain an
entailment relation, which meets our aims, dened in the previous section.
4
In the rest of the paper we will treat ! and : as basic connectives. Notwithstanding, for didactical
and illustrative reasons we will use in the current section : and ^ as basic.
2.1 Truth tables 5
Consider the following set of sentences X = A;:A;A^B. The interpretation that A
is both true and false is necessary in order to nd a model for X . But then, what is the
truth value of a compound statement like A ^B ? That is we have to ll the gaps in the
following truth value table:
^ t f > ?
> ? ? ? ?
Our interpretation is that if a sentence A has the truth value > or ? then it is (up
to now) uncertain, but we will see in the future whether the sentence is true or false.
Therefore, suppose what will happen to A ^ B if I(A) = > and I(B) = f . In this case
A could become true or false but due to I(B) = f the sentence A ^ B will never become
true. Hence,
^ t f > ?
> ? f ? ?
The case I(B) = t is similiar. Here the truth value of the conjunct depends solely on
the truth value of A which is the uncertain truth value >. Therefore,
^ t f > ?
> > f ? ?
What about the remaining gaps? Their value must be an uncertain one like > or
?. We think that a sentence whose truth value is > should be read as overdetermined
(underdetermined in the case that I(A) = ?). And if A and B are overdetermined so is
the adjunct A ^ B.
^ t f > ?
> > f > ?
The last gap is the most dicult one and we've got no knocking down philosophical
arguments why it should be ? except the following one: if, and the thing wildly possible,
we want fA ^ Bg to entail A and to entail B, we have to prevent that I(A) = > and
I(B) = ? satises fA ^ Bg (keeping in mind that > is a designated truth value).
5
This
leads us to
^ t f > ?
> > f > ?
Similiar arguments are leading to the cases where I(A) = ?. If B is true, then the
truth of A ^ B depends merely on A.
5
Note that there is an argument why the truth value of the adjunct should be >: if something has
neither been told true nor false (that is it is unknown) the assertion of such a sentence is consistent in a
classical sense. That is any sentence whose truth value is ? can be asserted without causing (big) problems.
But if we know that of a conjunctive sentence A^B one part is > while the other one is ?, then we cannot
consistently assume that A ^B holds.
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^ t f > ?
> > f > ?
? ? ? ? ?
Now if B is false, then the compound statement will never become true. That is,
^ t f > ?
> > f > ?
? ? f ? ?
If B is > and we want ^ to be an associative operation, we can reduce this to the case
where I(A) = > and I(B) = ?.
^ t f > ?
> > f > ?
? ? f > ?
The case where I(A) = I(B) = ? should be read as A is underdetermined and B is
underdeterminded. Hence, A ^ B is underdetermined.
The complete table is:
^ t f > ?
t t f > ?
f f f f f
> > f > ?
? ? f ? ?
The truth table for negation is very simple. The interpretation of ? was: neither a
statement nor its negation has been told. Therefore, if A is underdetermined, so is :A.
A similiar argument holds for >.
t f > ?
: f t > ?
The denition of A _B as :(:A ^ :B) and A! B as :A _ B yields
_ t f > ?
t t t t t
f t f > ?
> t > > ?
? t ? ? ?
! t f > ?
t t f > ?
f t t t t
> t > > ?
? t ? ? ?
2.2 Truth functional completeness 7
The above tables show that A ! A is no theorem
6
and more than that: our logic (if
we call the set of truth tables a logic) does not have any tautologies. Indeed, this is very
bizarre. A closer look shows that there is no well-formed formula to represent the epistemic
state of A is underdetermined, but there are ws which represent the other truth values.
For example `A has been told to be true' is represented by fAg, wheras `A has been told
both, to be true and to be false' can be represented by fA;:Ag. If we choose the empty set
to represent A is underdetermined, we cannot distinguish between A is underdetermined
and B is underdetermined. Therefore, we introduce a new operator,r (which is similiar to
the T-supplement in three-valued logic) to denote A is underdetermined byrA, associating
with r the following truth table:
t f > ?
r f f f t
Let t
4
be the tupel [(!;:;r); ft; f;>;?g; ft;>g].
2.2 Truth functional completeness
Are the truth tables for :;!;r given in section 2.1 sucient to generate all possible truth
tables, i.e., are they functionally complete?
It is easy to see that t
4
is not functionally complete. For example consider the function
g :  !  such that g(t) = g(f) = g(>) = g(?) = >. Clearly, g cannot be dened using
!;: and r. The reason is that there a subset X   , namely ft; fg, which is closed under
!;: and r. One way to solve the problem is to dene a truth function (shift negation
7
,
denoted by /) in order to obtain truth functional completeness. The following will do:
t f > ?
/ ? t f >
In this section we replace the r-operator by /; let T
4
:= [(!;:; /); ft; f;>;?g; ft;>g].
A class of truth value functions G is called functionally complete if and only if every other
truth value function can be expressed in terms of the functions in G. A function is T
4
-
denable i it can be expressed in terms of :;! and /. Furthermore let F be a class of
functions dened on  = ft; f;?;>g; a subset X   is said to be F-closed if X is closed
under the application of all f 2 F . The F-closure of X   is the smallest F-closed set
containing X .
6
The fact that A ! A is no theorem is worse than one would presume; 6j= A ! A means that the
normalization condition (NC) for implication (i.e. A! B takes a non-designated truth value if and only
if I(A) is a designated one but not I(B)) is not fullled. This in turn means that the Rosser/Turquette
procedure for axiomatizing the set of tautologies cannot be applied. Additionally NC is also violated by
the fact that A ! B takes the truth value > for I(A) = > and I(B) = f ; but this in turn guarantees
the formal treatment of Mobal's blocking behaviour or more generally: a nonmonotonic behaviour of the
entailment relation of section 3 which is based on T
4
. Indubitably one could reasonably ask whether there
ain't no other pssobility to simulate blocking without the infringement of NC. The answer is `No, not
within a truth-functional (extensional) semantics'. This can be seen by looking at the basic assumption of
nonmonotonic systems; A;A! B should be valid but B could not be satised.
7
After nishing the paper we found out that an identical function (
m
) has been found by Post in 1921
([Post, 1921]).
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In order to prove the functional completeness of T
4
, we rst show that the functions

k
:  !  are T
4
-denable
8
.

k
(x) =
(
t for x = k
f otherwise
Lemma 1 
k
(x), k 2  is T
4
-denable.
All proofs missing in the body of the paper can found in the Appendix. The following
lemma has been adopted from [Urquhart, 1986] (Lemma 2.9)
Lemma 2 Let F be a set of functions on  = ft; f;>;?g containing :;!; / as well as all
the 
k
. Then an n-place function g is F-denable if and only if g(~x) is in the F-closure
of fx
1
; : : : ; x
n
g, for all ~x in  .
Theorem 1 T
4
is functionally complete.
ProofWe will show that every unary function is T
4
denable and that the only non-empty
T
4
-closed subset of  is  itself. Hence, T
4
is functionally complete by Lemma 2. The
function T (x) = t for all x is T
4
-denable:
T (x) = :(x! x)! (/x! : / /x)
Furthermore the functions T
k
for any k 2  are dened as
T
k
(x) :=
(
f for x 6= t
t otherwise
are T
4
-denable as proved by the following:
T
f
(x) = :T (x)
T
t
(x) = 
t
(x)
T
?
(x) = : /
t
(x)
T
>
(x) = : / /
t
(x)
Now let g(x) be any one place  -valued function. Then the following function coincides
with g:
T
g(t)
(x)_ T
g(f)
(/x)_ T
g(>)
(/ / x) _ T
g(?)
(/ / /x)
The application of Lemma 2 yields the functional completeness of T
4
.
J
As a general remark on functional completeness of T
4
let us state that although there
is no intuitive reading of the one place function /, it provides the basis of functions that
make more sense, e.g., r.
8
Don't try to look for a natural meaning of these functions; we don't have any in mind. As in
[Urquhart, 1986] they serve as mathematical construction necessary for functional completeness.
2.3 Relationship between T
4
and Kleene's K
3
9
2.3 Relationship between T
4
and Kleene's K
3
This short section relates the above truth tables to the well known strong three-valued logic
K
3
. As we will discuss in section 4.1 the philosophical implications are far-reaching. This is
due to the fact that `overdenedness' and `underdenedness' have the same epistemological
status; both lack information, although the set of valid sentences increases
9
. We took this
into account by the denition of the truth tables: both truth values > and ? could change
to t or f in a future epistemic state. These issues will be treated in a later section. We
restrict ourselves in this section to the meaning of the basic connectives.
Within three-valued logics there are dierent interpretations of the third truth value
I . One is to read I as `undened', another one is `meaningless' and a third one is
`paradoxical'
10
There is a close relationship between Kleene's strong three-valued logic
K
3
and the system T
4
. To see this, we restrict our truth tables to three truth values:
t; f;X where X may be substituted by > or ?.
Consider the following truth tables:
_ t X f
t t t t
X t X X
f t X f
! t X f
t t X f
X t X X
f t t t
^ t X f
t t X f
X X X f
f f f f
t X f
: f X t
The reader may check that these tables correspond to those of section 2.1. Further-
more these truth tables are exactly those dened by Kleene's strong three-valued logic K
3
([Kleene, 1952]). The only but important dierence is that K
3
has only t as designated
truth value. Of course, since we did not compare Kleene's notion of entailment with ours,
we cannot say that our logic is really a combination of Kleene's logic, but as far as the
truth tables are concerned, it is.
3 Entailment Relations
In this section we will consider the propositional case of our four-valued logic. That is, we
assume the classical propositional language L
c
with the connectives of T
4
. First, we will
develop a notion of semantic entailment before we investigate a syntactic characterization
of this consequence relation. In the following APROP and PROP denote the sets of atomic
propositions and propositions, respectively.
Let I be an interpretation function which maps every sentence of a propositional
language into the set  = ft; f;>;?g of truth values. Now let D   be the set of
designated truth values. We say that I satises an atomic proposition P (denoted by
I j= P ), if I(P ) 2 D. The satisability relation j= can be extended as usual in order
to capture compound propositions. If X is a set of propositions we say that I j= X if I
satises every element of X .
9
Unlike Belnap's four-valued logic where knowledge increases with every new sentence, T
4
treats overde-
termined formulas as uncertain (i.e., knowledge decreases).
10
Note that we have dierent truth values namely > and ? to denote `undened' and `paradoxical'.
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A sentence A is a consequence of a set X of sentences (or: X entails A, denoted
by X  A) if every model of X is also a model of A. This is the standard Bolzano
denition of entailment, which unfortunately does not meet our aims. Consider the set
X = fA;A ! Bg. We wish that this set entails B. But there is an interpretation
I(A) = >; I(B) = f which satises X but not B. The reason is that there are two
designated truth values: t and >; if we choose I(A) = >, we would satisfy :A as well.
But :A has not been mentioned in our set of formulas. What we've got here is a kind of
over-interpretation. We have to look for a kind of 'minimal truth assignment'. Therefore
we assume an ordering relation  on the set of truth values. In our case we dene
?  t  > and ?  f  >
11
.
Denition 1 (j=, j=

) Let I : APROP !  be an interpretation, D the set of desig-
nated truth values and A a formula. We dene a relation j= between an interpretation
and a formula
I j= A if I(A) 2 D
and relation j=

between an interpretation and a set of propositions
I j=

X if I j= A for all A 2 X and I is minimal w.r.t  :
The sets MOD and

MOD can be dened as usual: MOD(X) := fM jM j= Xg and

MOD(X) := fM jM j=

Xg.
We say that a formula A is satisable (valid) if there is (for all) an interpretation I
such that I j= A. It is now easy to see that I(A) = >; I(B) = f is no minimal model for
X = fA;A! Bg, since there is an interpretation I
0
(A) = t and I
0
(B) = t which satises
X , and for every atomic proposition p, I
0
(p)  I(p).
The relation j=

is useful for dening an appropriate entailment relation :
Denition 2 (, ENT) Let X be a set of formulas, A a formula. We say that X  A
if for every I such that I j=

X, I j= A. The operator ENT is dened as ENT(X) :=
fAjX  Ag.
Let us call L
4
= hT
4
;; j=

i.
Proposition 1 1. X  ENT(X) (Inclusion)
2. If X  A then for every M j=

X, M j=

A (Dot entailment)
3. If X  A and X  B then X [ fAg  B (Cumulativity)
4. X  A does not imply that X [ fBg  A for an arbitrary B (Nonmonotonicity)
5. ENT(X) = ENT(ENT(X)) (Idempotency)
Corollar 1 If

MOD(X) 

MOD(A) then

MOD(X) 

MOD(X [ fAg)
11
This is exactly Belnap's lattice A4.
11
The next observation is closely related to Section 1.1, where we pointed out that either
`inconsistencies are inferred' or `from someting inconsistent nothing should be inferred' is
a plausible scheme of reasoning. In our logic inconsistencies are allowed in the sense that
they don't produce the set of all ws. If a set of formulas T is consistent in a classical
sense of the term (i.e. A ^ :A 62 T ), so is the -closure.
Observation 1 Let T be a set of ws and A a formula. fA;:Ag 6 T if and only if
T 1 A ^ :A.
We now come to some brief observations, which characterize the relationship between
our four-valued semantics and the classical two-valued semantics. In order to describe the
relationship we restrict the set of well-formed formulas of L
4
to the language L
c
of classical
propositional calculus. In the following we denote by I
4
(I
2
) a four-valued (two-valued)
interpretation of the sentences in L
c
and by 1
c
the classical entailment relation. The
concepts of satisability and validity for the two-valued semantics are dened as usual.
The rst observation is trivial:
Observation 2 Let X  L
c
be a set of formulas. If X has a two-valued model, then there
is a four-valued model for X.
Observation 3 Let L
c
be the classical propositional language, X a set of formulas. For
every formula A, which is satisable, but not valid concerning X, the following holds:
1. X 1
c
A
2. X  rA and X  r:A in our extended language i there is a unique I such that
I j=

X
4 Axiomatizability and other problems
In classical logic - and this is easy to see - the axiomatizability of the entailment relation
can be guaranteed by the facts that the set of tautologies is axiomatizable, the entailment
relation is monotonic and modus ponens (MP) is a correct rule of proof. For L
4
, however,
MP is not correct for arbitrary sets of formulas, i.e., no correct rule of inference.
Observation 4 If A;A! B are tautologies, then MP is a correct of proof, i.e., B is also
a tautology.
4.1 Belief revision and reasoning by defaults
It has been mentioned by Makinson and Gardenfors that belief-revision and nonmonotonic
reasoning are two sides of the same coin and Makinson published a method for transferring
one system into the other. Despite these results we think that the motivation for using
a logic for nonmonotonic reasoning diers from that of belief revision. A logic for non-
monotonic reasoning tries to capture non-deductive reasoning in a deductive formalism
(reasoning based on assumptions). In our terms `reasoning with assumptions' means that
there is a normative reassignment of truth values; formulas which had the truth value ?
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(or in classical terms, which were not valid but only satisable) get one of the truth values
t or f . Once they have this interpretation, it will never become uncertain again. A logic
for nonmonotonic reasoning only shifts a formula's assignment from the bottom level to
the mid level of the truth value lattice (shown in Figure 4.1); once things are certain they
will remain certain. On the contrary belief revision cannot guarantee this property. If a set
of beliefs has been revised (or better contracted) nobody will witness that the contracted
formula will not be added at a later stage. Ergo, the nonmonotonicity of belief revision is
`not as safe as' than that of a typical logic for reasoning based on assumptions. Within
the rst one a sentence or a belief may fall from the top to the middle of the lattice; new
information may jostle it to the top.
@
@
@
 
 
 @
@
@
 
 
 
6
-
>
f
?
t
truth
data
Figure 4.1 Belnap's lattice A4.
4.2 Conclusions
Starting from a wishlist for a notion of paraconsistent entailment, we developed a four-
valued semantics for the connectives : and ^. This semantics turned out to be a combi-
nation of two variations on Kleene's strong three-valued logic K
3
which means that the
truth values > and ? in our four-valued semantics correspond to the notion of a truth
value gap in K
3
. This in turn implies that the epistemic status of an overdetermined
and underdetermined sentence in our semantics is the same: both represent a lack of
knowledge, albeit the amount of told sentences (data) diers. Coherently, the entailment
relation which is based on a notion of minimal models does not allow the entailment of a
sentence via disjunctive syllogism with overdetermined premisses. This type of paracon-
sistent entailment is very cautious and maybe the least possible one in the sense that it
isolates classical inconsistencies. Table 4.2 illustrates the major dierences between L
4
,
Belnap's four-valued logic A4 and Mobal's inferential behaviour:
Formulas Mobal A4 L
4
X = fA;:A;A! Bg X 6`
M
B X 
B
B X 6 B
X = fA;:B;A! Bg X `
M
B X 
B
B X 6 B
Table 4.2
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`
M
denotes Mobal's inference relation and 
B
denotes Belnap's entailment relation.
The next step is to axiomatize the set of all tautologies via a sequent-style calculus,i.e.,
to develop a proof theory for L
4
.
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5 Appendix: Proofs
Lemma 1 
k
(x), k 2  is T
4
-denable.
Proof We will dene the corresponding functions 
k
for every k 2  . Dene
g(x) =
8
>
<
>
:
t for x = t or x = f
f for x = >
> for x = ?
g(x) = /:(x! x) is L
4
-denable. Now consider the following function:
f(x) =
(
t for x 2 ft; f;>g
? otherwise
f(x) = :(x ! x) ! (/x ! /x) is L
4
-denable. The reader may verify that the
following equations hold:

?
(x) = :(g(g(f(x)))) (1)

t
(x) = 
?
(/x) (2)

f
(x) = 
?
(/ / x) (3)

>
(x) = 
?
(/ / /x) (4)
Note that 
?
is exactly the same as the r-operator.
J
Lemma 2 Let F be a set of functions on  = ft; f;>;?g containing :;!; / as well as all
the 
k
. Then an n-place function g is F-denable if and only i g(~x) is in the F-closure
of fx
1
; : : : ; x
n
g, for all ~x in  .
Proof For the ) part assume that g is F-denable. By denition of the F-closure of
fx
1
; : : : ; x
n
g it follows that g(~x) is in the F-closure of fx
1
; : : : ; x
n
g. For the converse ((-
part) assume that g(~x) is in the F-closure of fx
1
; : : : ; x
n
g. Now consider the function 	
as dened below and an n-tupel ~a in  .
	(~a) := :
a
1
(x
1
) _ : : :_ :
a
n
(x
n
) _ g(~a)
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Clearly, 	(~a) takes the value g(~a) if ~x = ~a and t otherwise. Now let ~a
1
; : : : ;~a
n!
be all
possible disjunct inputs for 	. Then
g(~x) = 	(~a
1
)! 	(~a
2
)! : : :! 	(~a
n!
)
Hence, g is F-denable.
J
Proposition 1 1. X  ENT(X) (Inclusion)
2. If X  A then for every M j=

X, M j=

A (Dot entailment)
3. If X  A and X  B then X [ fAg  B (Cumulativity)
4. X  A does not imply that X [ fBg  A for an arbitrary B (Nonmonotonicity)
5. ENT(X) = ENT(ENT(X)) (Idempotency)
Proof
Inclusion Trivial. Since fromM j=

fAg it follows thatM j=

fAg, we have fAg  A, the
relation  is reexive.
Dot entailment Trivial. Since M is an interpretation function which assigns each atom
a truth value and the function does not change.
Cumulativity We know that

MOD(X) 

MOD(A) and

MOD(X) 

MOD(B). The
proposition follows if we can show that if X  A then

MOD(X) =

MOD(X [ fAg).
We show this by contradiction. Therefore assume that

MOD(X) 6=

MOD(X [fAg).
Then there are two cases:
1. Assume there is an M such that M j=

X and M 6 j=

X [ fAg. This means
that the conjunction of all elements of the set X [ fAg is not entailed by X .
Since  is refelxive, X 1 A, which is a contradiction.
2. Assume there is M j=

X [ fAg but M 6 j=

X . Hence, X [ fAg 1 X in
contradiction to the inclusion property.
Nonmonotonicity Trivial, by counter-example.
Idempotency The relation ENT(X)  ENT(ENT(X)) follows from the inclusion. It
remains to show that ENT(ENT(X))  ENT(X). We have to show that for every
A 2 ENT(ENT(X)) it follows that A 2 ENT(X) (5)
Dene
 := ENT(X) X
Obviously, X  . A reformulation of 5 using 
X [   A implies X  A
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Thus we have to show that

MOD(X [ ) 

MOD(A) and

MOD(X) 

MOD() implies

MOD(X) 

MOD(A)
Since

MOD(X) 

MOD() we have by Corollar 1 that

MOD(X) 

MOD(X [ )
and from

MOD(X [ ) 

MOD(X) it follows that

MOD(X) 

MOD(A)
J
Corollar 1 If

MOD(X) 

MOD(A) then

MOD(X) 

MOD(X [ fAg)
Proof Obviously: for all M 2

MOD(X) : M j= A. Hence M j= X
1
: : : ^ : : :X
n
^ A
(X
1
; : : : ; X
n
2 X).
J
Observation 3 Let L
c
be the classical propositional language, X a set of formulas. For
every formula A, which is satisable, but not valid concerning X, the following holds:
1. X 1
c
A
2. X  rA and X  r:A in our extended language i there is a unique I such that
I j=

X
Proof
1. Obvious, by denition.
2. We have to proof that I
4
(A) = ? is the only allowed interpretation. From the
satisablity of A w.r.t X we conclude that I
2
(A) = t and I
0
2
(A) = f are possible
interpretations within the two-valued semantics. But the greatest lower bound of t
and f is according to our lattice ? which is also a possible interpretation. Moreover
I
4
(A) = ? is the only possible interpretation for j=

. Hence, X  rA and X 
r:A.
J
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